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I.

INTRODUCTION

Most workers' compensation schemes are designed to provide a
swift and sure source of benefits to injured workers by placing on
employers the risks and burdens of modern industry.1 In keeping
with this policy, Washington's Industrial Insurance Act2 (IIA)
requires injured workers to relinquish the right to sue at common law
for damages sustained on the job, and it requires employers to accept
liability for a measure of damages set out by the statute.' However,
if a worker's injuries are caused by the negligence of a third person
who is not in the worker's same employ, the IIA's third-party
provision allows the worker to pursue an independent cause of action
against the third person in addition to his workers' compensation
claim.'

* B.A., cum laude, 1990, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. Candidate 1996, Seattle
University School of Law. Lead Article Editor, Seattle University Law Review. I would like to
thank Gretchen Graham for her invaluable assistance in editing this article.
1. See Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusivenessof An Employee's Worker's CompensationRemedy
Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 406 (1988).

2. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24 (1994).
3. Id. In effect, a form of strict liability is imposed on the employer to pay for industrial
accidents. See Flanigan v. Department of Labor and Indus., 123 Wash. 2d 418, 431, 869 P.2d

14, 20 (1994) (Madsen, J., dissenting); see also Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 694 P.2d 907, 909
(Kan. Ct. App. 1985).
4. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.030 (1994). The statute, however, then provides for a
reimbursement to the state workers' compensation fund. See id. § 51.24.060.
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This type of third-party liability provision has prompted
considerable debate as to whether an injured employee may ever sue
his employer or a co-employee as a third-party tortfeasor. 5 Attempts by
injured workers to circumvent the exclusive remedy principle in this
way have given rise to the dual capacity and dual persona doctrines,6
under which the employer or co-employees of an injured worker may
be found independently liable for the worker's injuries, regardless of
whether the worker also recovered workers' compensation benefits.
These doctrines are premised on the concept that when an employer
or co-employee also serves in a distinct nonemployment capacity
toward the employee, or has a legal persona other than that of
employer or co-employee, the exclusive remedy principle will not bar
the employee's common-law remedies.
The application of the dual capacity and dual persona doctrines
has an enormous impact on employers, particularly employers who run
small businesses or closely-held corporations. For example, many
individuals who serve as the sole shareholder, director, and officer of
a small, closely-held corporation also, as individuals, own the land on
which the corporation is located. Under a recent judicial decision in
Washington State, these small businesses, and the individuals who run
them, may be subject to a new threat of liability.7
This Note will first explain the structure of Washington's IIA and
the exclusive remedy principle. Next, it will explore the third-party
provision of the IIA and the judicially-created doctrines that have
made employers and co-employees vulnerable to tort suits by injured
workers regardless of the exclusive remedy principle. Finally, this
Note will discuss the Washington Supreme Court's recent decision in
Evans v. Thompson' and argue that the court should not have allowed
consideration of the dual persona doctrine on remand because the
doctrine, if applied, will circumvent the exclusive remedy principle and
put the landowners at unjustifiable risk of being held liable for
workplace injuries.
II.

WASHINGTON'S INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE ACT

This section first gives a general introduction to Washington's
IIA, then describes the exclusive remedy principle and the third-party

5.
6.
7.
8.

See 2A ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.81 (1993).
See generally id. § 92.81. See infra notes 25-78 and accompanying text.
See Evans v. Thompson, 124 Wash. 2d 435, 879 P.2d 938 (1994).
Id.
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provision, and finally explores the dual capacity and dual persona
doctrines as two exceptions to the exclusive remedy principle.
The IIA provides for compensation to injured employees
regardless of fault. For example, if a worker is injured while on the
job, the worker may make a claim to the state workers' compensation
fund regardless of whether the worker's employer legally caused the
injury. The IIA requires all employers ° to pay into the accident
fund premiums necessary to maintain "actuarial solvency of the
accident and medical aid funds in accordance with recognized insurance
principles.""
A.

The Exclusive Remedy Principle

In exchange for this guaranteed right of recovery, workers lose the
right to bring common-law suits against their employers for on-the-job
injuries." In such cases, the IIA provides the exclusive remedy."
As a result, the IIA bars all independent causes of action brought by
employees against their employers for damages arising out of unintentional work-place injuries. 4 The IIA similarly bars all independent
causes of action against an injured worker's co-employees. 1

9. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1994) provides:
The common law system governing the remedy of workers against employers for
injuries received in employment is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. In
practice it proves to be economically unwise and unfair. Its administration has produced
the result that little of the cost of the employer has reached the worker and that little
only at large expense to the public. The remedy of the worker has been uncertain, slow
and inadequate. Injuries in such works, formerly occasional, have become frequent and
inevitable. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and even more upon
the welfare of its wage worker. The state of Washington, therefore, exercising herein
its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn
from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workers, injured in their work,
and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and
to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise
provided in this title; and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such
personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are
hereby abolished, except as in this title provided.
10. The IIA does not impose such responsibility on employers who are self-insured. WASH.
REV. CODE § 51.14 (1994).
11. Id. § 51.16.035.
12. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1994), civil actions arising out of work-related
injuries are abolished and replaced with the exclusive remedies and benefits under the IIA. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Lewis County, 92 Wash. 2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 (1979).
13. Kimball v. Millet, 52 Wash. App. 512, 513, 762 P.2d 10, 11 (1988).
14. Provost v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 103 Wash. 2d 750, 752, 696 P.2d 1238,
1239 (1985).
15. Id. at 752, 696 P.2d at 1240.
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The courts have carefully construed this statutorily created quid
pro quo in order to eliminate common-law claims and to further the
purposes of the 1A. 6 Thus, workers who receive workers' compensation benefits under the IIA have no separate remedy for injuries
except where the IIA specifically authorizes a cause of action.
B.

Third-PartySuits

One such authorized cause of action arises when a third party, not
in the worker's same employ, has caused the injury. 7 Wash. Rev.
Code § 51.24.030 provides:
If a third person, not in a worker's same employ, is or may become
liable to pay damages on account of a worker's injury for which
benefits and compensation are provided under this title, the injured
worker 8or beneficiary may elect to seek damages from the third
person.

The underlying concept of these third-party suits is that, for moral and
public policy reasons, "the ultimate loss from wrongdoing should fall
upon the actual wrongdoer."' 19 Under Washington law, the authorization for suits against third parties in Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.030
effectuates two principal policies. First, it allows and encourages
workers to seek full compensation from responsible third parties for
injuries they suffer in the course of their employment. 20 Second, the

16. Thompson, 92 Wash. 2d at 209, 595 P.2d at 543; Kimball, 52 Wash. App. at 514, 762
P.2d at 11.
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.030 (1994).
18. Id. § 51.24.030(l). WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (1994) defines "worker" as:
[Elvery person in this state who is engaged in the employment of an employer under
this tide, whether by way of manual labor or otherwise in the course of his or her
employment; also every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or
who is working under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her
personal labor for an employer under this title, whether by way of manual labor or
otherwise, in the course of his or her employment ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.013 (1994) defines "acting in the course of employment" as:
[Tihe worker acting at his or her employer's direction or in the furtherance of his or her
employer's business which shall indude time spent going to and from work on the
jobsite ...,insofar as such time is immediate to the actual time that the worker is
engaged in the work process in areas controlled by his or her employer ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.070 (1994) defines "employer" as:
[Any person, body of persons, corporate or otherwise, and the legal representatives of
a deceased employer, all while engaged in this state in any work covered by the
provisions of this title, by way of trade or business, or who contracts with one or more
workers, the essence of which is the personal labor of such worker or workers.
19. 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 71.10.
20. Flanigan v. Department of Labor and Indus., 123 Wash. 2d 418, 424, 869 P.2d 14, 17
(1994).
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third-party statute provides workers with immediate compensation for
injuries, subject to reimbursement to the workers' compensation fund
if the worker later recovers from the third party.2
Because of the exclusive remedy principle, employers and coemployees are immune from suit under this third-party statute.22
Yet, the language "not in a worker's same employ" has raised some
difficult issues in certain contexts. For example, some cases indicate
that when an employer or co-employee has two separate roles or owes
two separate sets of duties to an employee, the employer or coemployee might, in the appropriate circumstances, be subject to suit
under the third-party statute regardless of the exclusive remedy
principle.23
C.

Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Principle: The Dual
Capacity and Dual Persona Doctrines

In certain circumstances, courts have allowed an injured employee
who has already received workers' compensation benefits to bring a
common-law suit against his employer or co-employee under the IIA's
third-party suit provision. This situation arises when the employer or
co-employee serves in several capacities, or owes a distinct legal duty
to an injured worker not stemming from the employer or co-employee's status as an employer or co-employee.
In most jurisdictions, the law in this area has developed on an ad
hoc basis without legislative involvement. Two related common-law
theories-the dual capacity and dual persona doctrines-provide tests
to determine when employers or co-employees may be considered third
parties for purposes of tort suits stemming from workplace injuries.24

21. Id.
22. See Duvon v. Rockwell Int'l. 116 Wash. 2d 749, 753, 807 P.2d 876, 878 (1991).
Professor Larson supports the argument, adopted by Washington courts, that co-employees
should be immune from suit under the third-party provision:
The reason for the employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by which the employer
gives up his normal defenses and assumes automatic liability, while the employee gives
up his right to common-law verdicts. This reasoning can be extended to the tortfeasor
co-employee; he, too, is involved in this compromise of rights. Perhaps... one of the
things he is entitled to expect in return for what he has given up is freedom from
common-law suits based on industrial accidents in which he is at fault.
2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.22, at 14-152. Larson states that "[t]he great majority of states
S.. now exclude co-employees from the category of 'third persons."' Id. § 72.21, at 14-119.
23. See, e.g., Corr v. Willamette Indus., 105 Wash. 2d 217, 223, 713 P.2d 92, 96 (1986)
("[Tihe court might apply the dual persona doctrine in the proper case...."); Kimball v. Millet,

52 Wash. App. 512, 762 P.2d 10 (1988).
24. See infra notes 25-78 and accompanying text.
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1. The Dual Capacity Doctrine
The dual capacity doctrine, at one time an important exception to
the exclusive remedy principle, establishes a separate relationship or
theory of liability between injured workers and employers. The
doctrine stems from the concept that a single legal person may be said
to have many "capacities." 2 For example, a single legal person may
serve in one capacity as an employer, but in another as a landowner
who owes common-law landowner duties to the employees who work
on the land. If a worker is injured on the jobsite, the employer, in his
or her capacity as an employer, would be immune from common-law
suit under the exclusive remedy principle. The employer in his or her
capacity as a landowner, however, would not be immune from
common-law suit in tort.
A few jurisdictions at one time vigorously applied the dual
capacity doctrine.2 6 However, because this broad theory effectively
destroys employer immunity whenever a separate relationship or theory
of liability exists, many jurisdictions have rejected it altogether. These
jurisdictions see the doctrine as defeating the exclusive remedy
principle of workers' compensation schemes.27
Washington courts have similarly rejected the dual capacity
doctrine: The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that the

25. 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.81(a).
26. The dual capacity doctrine was widely used in California and Ohio, but only for a short
period of time. See, e.g., Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Cal. 1958) (holding that a doctor who
treated his own employee for a non work-related injury could be sued in his second capacity as
a practicing physician); Guy v. Arthur H. Thompson Co., 378 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ohio 1978)
(allowing a tort action to proceed against an employer where the employer, a hospital, had treated

the employee for workplace injuries because it had a duty of care separate and distinct from that
arising out of its capacity as employer). In 1982, the California Legislature abolished the dual
capacity doctrine by passing Assembly Bill 684, which amended § 3602 of the California Labor
Code. See 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.81(c), at 14-290.109. The Ohio Supreme Court
declined to apply the doctrine in Freese v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 445 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio
1983). See generally 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.81(c), at 14-290.101.
27. See, e.g., Swichtenberg v. Brimer, 828 P.2d 1218, 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (finding
that the dual capacity doctrine conflicts with Arizona's workers' compensation statute and subverts
the legislature's purpose in enacting the exclusive remedy provision); Porter v. Beloit Corp., 391
S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (declining to apply the dual capacity doctrine insofar as it
removes employer immunity in cases predicated upon a mere separate relationship or theory of
liability), cert. denied, 1990 Ga. LEXIS 649 (Ga. Mar. 13, 1990). See generally 2A LARSON, supra
note 5, § 72 .81(a) ("since the term 'dual capacity' has proved to be subject to such misapplication
");
King, supra note 1.
and abuse, the only effective remedy is to jettison it altogether ....
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dual capacity doctrine can be abused and extended such that the
exclusive remedy provision becomes essentially defunct.2"
Washington courts first considered the dual capacity doctrine in
Thompson v. Lewis County.2 9 In that case, Richard Thompson, an
employee of the Lewis County Road Department, was driving a county
truck in the course of his employment when a vehicle pulled onto the
In order to avoid a collision,31
road in front of him and stalled.
Thompson drove the truck off the roadway and into a tree.
Thompson was seriously injured.32 He made a claim under the IIA
Thompson then
and received workers' compensation benefits. 3
brought a suit against the County under a dual capacity theory,
arguing that in one capacity the County was his employer, but in
another capacity the County was a municipal corporation or governmental agency with a duty to properly construct and maintain county
roads for the use and benefit of the public. 4
The court decided that Thompson's exclusive remedy was the IIA
35
he could not bring a common-law suit against the County.
that
and
Although the court acknowledged that the workers' compensation act
should be liberally construed in favor of beneficiaries,36 the court
refused to apply the dual capacity doctrine, holding that the IIA bars
all other remedies of an employee against his employer unless that
employer also exists as another distinct legal entity.37 Because
Thompson's employer and the governmental entity that he alleged
owed him a municipal duty were the same county department and not
two distinct legal entities, Thompson could not bring suit.
In Spencer v. Seattle,38 the Washington Supreme Court revisited
the issue presented in Thompson and again rejected the dual capacity
doctrine for government employees. In Spencer, a civil engineer for the
Seattle Parks Department was run over by a truck as he stepped into
a crosswalk while in the course of employment.39 Spencer applied for
28. See, e.g., Corr v. Willarnette Indus., 105 Wash. 2d 217, 713 P.2d 92 (1986); Spencer
v. Seattle, 104 Wash. 2d 30, 700 P.2d 742 (1985); Thompson v. Lewis County, 92 Wash. 2d 204,
595 P.2d 541 (1979).
29. 92 Wash. 2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 (1979).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 205, 595 P.2d at 542.
Id.at 206, 595 P.2d at 542.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 208, 595 P.2d at 543.
See id. at 209, 595 P.2d at 544.
104 Wash. 2d 30, 700 P.2d 742 (1985).
Id. at 31, 700 P.2d at 743.
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and received industrial insurance benefits.4" He then filed suit against
the City for his injuries, alleging that they resulted from the negligent
design, construction, and repair of the crosswalk.4 1
The City argued, based on the exclusive remedy principle, that
42
Spencer could not maintain a common-law cause of action against it.
Spencer argued that the City could be sued under the dual capacity
doctrine because the City acted in a dual capacity as (1) an employer
with an obligation to provide employees with a safe place to work; and
(2) a municipality with an obligation to provide members of the public
with adequately designed, constructed, and maintained city streets and
crosswalks. 3
The court, however, refused to accept Spencer's invocation of the
dual capacity doctrine, holding that because the third-party provision
of the IIA focuses on the identity of the third person, that third person
must be someone other than the employer.4 The court found that
the identity of the City as a municipality was not completely independent from and unrelated to its identity as an employer.45 In rejecting
the dual capacity doctrine, the court noted that every jurisdiction
presented with the issue had also rejected the doctrine in cases
involving an action by a government employee against the government.4 6
In Corr v. Willamette Industries,47 the Washington Supreme
Court again considered and rejected the dual capacity doctrine. In that
case, Corr, an employee of Willamette Industries, was injured by
defective equipment while working.4" The defective equipment was
designed and built by Corco, a corporation that was absorbed by
Willamette prior to Corr's injury.49 Pursuant to the terms of the
merger agreement between Willamette and Corco, Willamette
"succeeded to all Corco's liabilities and obligations."50 Thus, in
addition to filing for and receiving workers' compensation benefits for
his injuries,5 he also sued Willamette, alleging that it acted in a dual

40. Id.

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 32, 700 P.2d at 743.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 33, 700 P.2d at 744.

Id.
Id.
105 Wash. 2d 217, 713 P.2d 92 (1986).
Id. at 218, 713 P.2d at 93.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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capacity as both an employer and a manufacturer of a product used in
the workplace. 2 In reaching its holding, the court explained that
"courts have rejected the dual capacity doctrine in the employer/manufacturer relationship because an employer's obligation to
provide a safe workplace cannot be separated from the duty owed by
an employer to his employees by reason of his manufacture of
equipment with which employees must work." 3
2.

The Dual Persona Doctrine

In response to concerns that the dual capacity doctrine undermines
the exclusive remedy principle, a more narrow formulation of the
duality concept has developed. Professor Arthur Larson advocates
abandoning the dual capacity theory and replacing it with a more
narrow formulation:
An employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by
an employee, if-and only if-he possesses a second persona so
completely independent from and unrelated to his status as employer
that by established
standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal
4
persona.5
This reformulated concept, the dual persona doctrine, focuses on the
identity of the third party, not the relationship of the third party to the
injured worker.5 5
a.

Dual Capacity vs. Dual Persona
Because an employer might have an additional relationship to an
employee, such as landowner, products manufacturer, vendor, bailor,
doctor, hospital, or safety inspector, the dual capacity doctrine, if
carried too far, could effectively render the exclusive remedy principle
powerless. 56 Furthermore, because in most cases the additional duties
are inextricably intertwined with those of the employer, 7 the dual
capacity doctrine will always circumvent the exclusive remedy
principle.58 However, the dual persona doctrine will protect employer

52. Id. at 218-19, 713 P.2d at 93-94.
53. Id. at 220, 713 P.2d at 94.
54. 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.81, at 14-290.88.
55. Id. § 72.81(a).
56. Id.

57. Id.§ 72.81(c).

58. See id. § 72.81(a).
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immunity in cases where there is no separate and distinct legal
59
persona.
For example, under the dual capacity doctrine, an employer who
individually owns the land upon which he runs his business will always
be held liable under the third-party statute because of his separate
capacity as a landowner, effectively ameliorating the exclusive remedy
principle.
Under the dual persona doctrine, however, the employer will not
necessarily be subject to common-law suit. Although the employer
will be subject to third-party liability if his duties as a landowner are
"completely independent from and unrelated to his status as employer,"6 he will be immune from a third-party suit if his persona as a
landowner is interconnected with his duties as an employer. Thus, the
dual persona doctrine does not extinguish the possibility of suit under
the third-party statute; it merely limits the circumstances in which
such suit is possible. This doctrine protects the exclusive remedy
principle, but also leaves the door open for injured employees to bring
suit in cases where employers really do owe employees two separate
and distinct legal duties.
b.

Application of the Dual Persona Doctrine

Courts have applied the dual persona doctrine in a few contexts,
most frequently in the contexts of corporate mergers and products

59. See id.
60. 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.81, at 14-290.88.
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liability.6' Courts have been less willing to apply the doctrine in the
62
landowner context.

61. See, e.g., Thomas v. Valmac Indus., 812 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Ark. 1991) (finding that
under the dual persona doctrine, an injured truck driver may pursue a tort claim against an
alleged tortfeasor who, at the time of the accident, was not the worker's employer but who, since
the accident, had become the worker's employer as the result of a corporate merger); Percy v.
Falcon Fabricators, 584 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (adopting the dual persona
doctrine and holding that an injured employee may sue her employer in tort when that employer
is the corporate successor of the manufacturer of the defective product that caused the injury, and
the product was manufactured before the corporate merger), review dismissed, 595 So. 2d 556 (Fla.
1992); Robinson v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 525 N.E.2d 1028, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that an employee who has received workers' compensation benefits may pursue a tort
action against his employer when the manufacturing corporation, by whom the employee has
never been employed, merged with the employer corporation prior to the time of the employee's
injuries); Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 694 P.2d 907, 912 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (adopting the dual
persona doctrine and allowing suit against a successor corporation when the successor corporation
absorbed the third-party manufacturer and assumed the liabilities of that manufacturer). But see
Hatch v. Lido Co. of New England, 609 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Me. 1992) (declining to adopt the dual
persona doctrine in a corporate merger context when the duty owed by the employer to the
injured worker-the duty to provide a safe workplace-was the same duty that the successor
corporation owed to the worker: "We are unable.., to accept the argument that when dealing
with an identical duty, the legislature intended the statutory process of merger to strip the
resulting corporation of the immunity conferred on it by the Worker's Compensation Act. Such
a result serves no purpose other than to avoid the limitations imposed by the Act.").
62. See, e.g., Landers v. Energy Sys. Management Co., 807 S.W.2d 33, 35-36 (Ark. 1991)
(holding that the dual persona doctrine does not apply in the landowner context and that the
employer cannot be sued as the owner or occupier of land); Vaughn v. Jernigan, 242 S.E.2d 482,
483 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that an individual landowner could not be sued in tort for a
defective condition on the premises when the individual leased the land to the corporate employer,
who employed both the individual landowner and the injured worker: The landowner's
"knowledge of the allegedly defective condition, as well as his authority to correct it, came to him
not through his ownership of the premises but through his active involvement in the management
of the employer corporation as its chief executive officer .... Accordingly, he cannot be labeled
a 'third-party tortfeasor,' and a recovery against him is precluded .... "); Kontos v. Boudros, 608
N.E.2d 573, 577 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that the dual persona doctrine does not apply in the case
where an individual is the landowner as well as the president, shareholder, and manager of the
restaurant that leases the land because the duty as landowner is not different from the duty as
employer to provide a safe workplace), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d 335 (I11.1993); Senken v.
Eklund, 552 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, who was both the landowner and the employer, because the obligation of the
landowner to provide a safe workplace was inseparable from the obligations arising in the
employment relationship); Heritage v. Van Patten, 453 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (N.Y. 1983) (holding
that, regardless of his status as owner of the premises where an injury occurred, a co-employee
of the injured worker is immune from suit. "To impose liability upon defendant ... would be
to disregard the express legislative prohibition ... of the Workers' Compensation Law which
makes compensation the exclusive remedy of an employee injured 'by the negligence or wrong of
another in the same employ."'). But see Patton v. Simone, Nos. 90C-JA-29, 90C-JL-219
Consolidated, 1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 277, at *19-20 (Del. Super. Ct. July 16, 1992) (denying
defendant landowner's motion for summary judgment and stating that an individual's status as
landowner and employer may give rise to separate liabilities under the dual persona doctrine, but
not stating when such circumstances may arise); Doggett v. Patrick, 398 S.E.2d 770, 771-72 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1990) (denying defendant landowner's motion for summary judgment and stating that
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In Washington, the supreme court has considered the dual
persona doctrine in both the corporate merger and the landowner
contexts, but has never applied it. For example, in Corr v. Willamette
Industries,63 the case in which a Willamette employee was injured by
equipment that was designed and built by Corco, Willamette's
corporate predecessor,64 the court considered applying the dual
persona doctrine in the corporate merger context, despite having
rejected the dual capacity doctrine. 65 The court, noting a rule from
another jurisdiction, stated, "where, by corporate merger, the employer
succeeds to the liabilities of the manufacturer of the equipment, the
employer cannot avoid those liabilities merely because the workers'
compensation law covered the [worker]. 66 Applying this principle
to the facts of Corr, the court recognized that Willamette could be
liable for Corr's injuries, as it succeeded to the liabilities and obligations of Corco when the two corporations merged.67
Nevertheless, the court found that liability could not be imposed
on Willamette. 68 The court held that Willamette could be liable only
if Corr could have sued Corco as a third-person tortfeasor had the
corporations not merged. 69 The court then found that Corr could not
have sued Corco absent the merger because Willamette would never
have acquired the defective equipment, and thus Corr would not have
been injured.70 Thus, although the court entertained the dual persona
concept in the corporate merger context, it decided that Corr was not
a proper case in which to apply it."
The court has also not applied the dual persona doctrine in the
landowner context. In Kimball v. Millet,72 the Millets, officers of a
farming corporation, individually owned the land on which the farm

the factual context may give rise to a separate legal persona to support liability when the
defendant (1) individually owned the premises on which the accident occurred, and (2) leased the
premises to the corporation of which he was the president); Labelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653,
655 (Me. 1991) (holding that a defendant landowner may be sued in his individual capacity as
landowner regardless of his role as shareholder, president, and treasurer of the corporate employer
because the corporate form gives rise to a separate legal persona).
63. 105 Wash. 2d 217, 713 P.2d 92 (1986).
64. Id. at 218, 713 P.2d at 93.
65. Id. at 220-21, 713 P.2d at 94.
66. Id. at 221, 713 P.2d at 95 (citing Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 412 N.E. 2d
934 (N.Y. 1980)).
67. Id. at 222, 713 P.2d at 95.
68. Id. at 223-24, 713 P.2d at 96.
69. Id. at 222, 713 P.2d at 95.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 223, 713 P.2d at 96.
72. 52 Wash. App. 512, 762 P.2d 10 (1988).

1995]

Employer Liability Under the Washington HA

was located, and leased the land to the corporation.7 3 Kimball, an
employee, was injured in the course of his employment by an
aggressive bull owned by the corporation.7 4 Kimball attempted to
characterize the Millets not as employers or co-employees, but as
landowners, invoking the dual persona doctrine.7"
The court,
however, refused to apply the doctrine, stating that employees cannot
easily avoid the protections afforded employers by the IIA.7 6 The
court held that the dual persona doctrine will not apply where the facts
supporting the claim are those under which a co-employee would be
immune from suit under the IIA.77 In such cases, the employer
cannot be said to have a second persona so completely separate as to
be recognized as a separate person for purposes of third-party liability
for an on-the-job injury.7"
Accordingly, although the Washington Supreme Court has not
applied the dual persona doctrine, the court has left the door open for
its use in future cases.
III.

EVANS V. THOMPSON
79

Evans v. Thompson may be that case. In Evans, the court
addressed the issue of whether employers and co-employees who are
also landowners may be held liable in tort under the third-party
provision of the IIA where an employee's injuries occur on that land.
This section will introduce the court's decision in Evans and will
explain both the majority and dissenting arguments.
A. Facts
In Evans, the widows of two deceased workers brought suit under
the third-party statute against Robert and Amber Thompson, the sole
shareholders, officers, and directors of Santana Trucking & Excavating,
Inc. (Santana), the Washington corporation that employed the
decedents8 0 The plaintiffs sued the Thompsons in their individual

73. Id. at 513, 762 P.2d at 11.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.; cf. Spencer v. City of Seattle, 104 Wash. 2d 30, 700 P.2d 742 (1985); Thompson v.
Lewis County, 92 Wash. 2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 (1979).
77. See Kimball, 52 Wash. App. at 514, 762 P.2d at 11.
78. Id.
79. 124 Wash. 2d 435, 879 P.2d 938 (1994).
80. See id. at 437, 879 P.2d at 939.
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capacities as the owners of the real property on which the decedents
were killed."'
The Thompsons had acquired title to the land for personal
investment purposes.8 2 Although the Thompsons as individuals owed
a balance on the parcel, Santana made the payments.8 3 The Thompsons did, however, show the payments as income on their personal tax
The Thompsons obtained construction and grading
returns.84
permits for work on the property and allowed Santana to use the
property for dumping fill materials.85
On the day of the accident, Santana sent the two workers, Evans
and Kanning, to inspect a storm drain system on the property. During
the inspection, Evans dropped a calculator into the manhole. After
Evans proceeded down the manhole to retrieve his calculator and did
not return, Kanning went after Evans. Both died from methane gas
accumulated at the bottom of the manhole. 6
ProceduralHistory
At trial, the plaintiffs alleged a breach of the duties owed to Evans
and Kanning by the Thompsons as landowners.8 7 The Thompsons
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims
were barred by the exclusive remedy principle because the Thompsons
were in the "same employ" as Evans and Kanning. 8 In other words,
the Thompsons argued that as officers, directors, and shareholders of
Santana, they were co-employees of Evans and Kanning and, as such,
they were immune from common-law suit based on the plain language
of the third-party statute.
The trial court granted the Thompsons' summary judgment
motion, 9 which the court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished
The court of appeals agreed that the Thompsons, as
opinion.
corporate officers and directors of Santana, were co-employees of the
B.

81. Id.
82. Id.at 438, 879 P.2d at 939.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.at 438-39, 879 P.2d at 939-40.
86. Id. at 436, 879 P.2d at 939.
87. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that "[t]he injuries and deaths ... were proximately caused
by the concealed (latent) ultrahazardous condition of Defendants' property." Id. at 437, 879 P.2d
at 939 (citation omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Evans v. Thompson, No. 28936-5-I (Wash. Ct. App. filed Jan. 4, 1993) (on file with

the Seattle University Law Review).
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decedents.9 Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the coemployees' landowner status could not be used to circumvent the
exclusive remedy provision of the IIA.92
C.

Washington Supreme Court Decision

The supreme court disagreed. In a 5-4 decision, the court
reversed and remanded the case for a factual determination of whether
Mr. and Mrs. Thompson were co-employees of the decedents. Rather
than treating this issue as a matter of law, the court treated it as a
matter of fact: On remand, if the trier of fact finds that the Thompsons were not co-employees, they will be subject to liability under the
third-party provision.93
In its decision, the majority addressed two issues: (1) When
defendants are landowners and constitute a completely separate legal
entity from the employer of a worker, are they immune under the IIA
for breach of their duties as landowners? (2) Are the officers and
directors of a corporate employer immune, as a matter of law, as coemployees, even though at least one of the officers and directors is not
employed by the corporation and performs no duties for the corpora94
tion?
The majority never articulated clear holdings on these issues;
rather, it stated that "there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the Defendants, particularly [Mrs. Thompson], were in fact
co-employees of the decedents."9 The court emphasized that Mrs.
Thompson was not employed by the corporation, owed no duties to
the corporation, performed no services for the corporation, and received
no wages or any form of compensation from the corporation.
Furthermore, Mr. Thompson failed to provide any evidence of his
actual duties for the9 corporation including whether he directed the dayto-day operations." Thus, the court held that it could not support
immunity as a matter of law.9" However, in reversing the court of
appeals' decision and remanding the case for further findings of fact,

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
See Evans, 124 Wash. 2d at 445, 879 P.2d at 943.
Id. at 437, 879 P.2d at 939.
Id. at 438, 879 P.2d at 939.
Id. at 445, 879 P.2d at 943.
Id.
Id. at 444-45, 879 P.2d at 943.
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the court stated that, under its decision, the plaintiffs do not necessari99
ly recover.
In support of its decision to remand the case, the court explained
that the third-party provision evidences a strong policy in favor of
actions against third parties. 10 0 Furthermore, the court stated that
the purpose of the exclusive remedy provision is to grant immunity to
the employer and co-employees acting in the scope and course of their
employment, not to create "artificial immunity to one whose only
connection with the corporate employer's business is having his or her
name on a piece of paper as an officer and/or director."' 0 ' Apparently, the court did not believe, based on the factual record, that Mr.
or Mrs. Thompson, as officers, directors, and shareholders, had enough
of a connection with Santana's business to receive immunity under the
exclusive remedy principle.
D. Dissent
Four justices vehemently disagreed with the majority, arguing that
the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy lies in the IIA.'0 2 Instead of remanding the case on the issue of whether the defendants as officers,
directors, and shareholders of Santana were in fact co-employees of the
decedents, the dissent would have applied a bright-line rule and found
that the Thompsons, as corporate officers, were "in the same employ"
as Evans and Kanning, and were therefore immune from third-party
liability under the IIA as a matter of law.0 3 The dissent argued that
characterizing the corporate officers as co-employees as a matter of law
"would be consistent with the IIA's general policy of increasing the
certainty and reducing the volume of litigation of workers' injuries. It
would also provide for uniform application of workers' compensation
laws in Washington and alleviate the possibility of fact finders reaching
'
inconsistent conclusions in different cases."'O

99. Id. at 438, 879 P.2d at 939.
100. Id. at 437, 879 P.2d at 939.
101. Id. at 447, 879 P.2d at 944.
102. [The majority] misstates the issues, ignores relevant Washington case law, relies
on inapposite cases from other jurisdictions, adopts a doctrine repeatedly rejected in
Washington, and issues an opinion that is itself internally inconsistent. Furthermore,
the majority never dearly articulates its holding, nor does it provide guidance for the

trial court on remand. Moreover I cannot agree on a policy level with the majority's
decision to weaken the exclusivity provisions of the IIA and broaden third party
liability. Therefore, I dissent.
Id. at 448, 879 P.2d at 944 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 450, 879 P.2d at 945-46.
104. Id. at 450, 879 P.2d at 946.
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The dissent clearly articulated, however, that even with this
bright-line rule, a corporate officer would not be immune from suit in
all cases. For instance, the dissent would not find a corporate officer
immune from suit when "he or she possess [sic] a second persona 'so
completely independent from and unrelated to' his or her status as a
co-employee that the law recognizes it as a separate person."105
Therefore, in certain cases, the dual persona doctrine would provide
some relief to an injured worker, such as when the defendant's status
as landowner is completely unrelated to his or her status as a corporate
officer such that an entirely separate legal entity exists."0 6
Unlike the majority, the dissent would apply the dual persona
doctrine only when the relationship between the co-employee and the
injured worker is too remote to justify immunity from liability. Such
a remote relationship would exist, for example, if the premises were
separately owned by a distinct legal entity, such as a partnership." 7
In all other cases, the dissent would find as a matter of law that a
corporate officer is a co-employee and receives immunity from
common-law suit under the exclusive remedy principle. Finding
otherwise, the dissent argued, would indiscriminately strip a corporate
officer of immunity, leaving the officer open to liability even for a
work-related injury. Additionally, finding otherwise would overbroaden the third-party provision and undermine the exclusive remedy
principle.'0 8
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE EVANS DECISION
In light of the strong disagreement between the majority and
dissent in Evans over the applicability of the dual persona doctrine,
this section will first address the general question of whether the dual
persona doctrine should apply in the landowner context. It will then
explain that the majority misapplied the dual persona doctrine,
effectively applying the previously-rejected dual capacity formulation
instead. Finally, this section will argue that the Thompsons should
have been considered co-employees as a matter of law.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 451, 879 P.2d at 946 (citations omitted).
Id. at 455, 879 P.2d at 948.
Id. at 455-56, 879 P.2d at 948.
Id. at 451, 879 P.2d at 946.
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The Dual Persona Doctrine in the Landowner Context

When an accident occurs on a jobsite and the owner of the
premises is also the employer or co-employee of the injured worker, the
legal personas of "landowner" and "employer or co-employee" will
usually not be sufficiently separate to justify application of the dual
persona doctrine. Although the landowner owes legal duties to the
employee separate from those owed by the employer or co-employee,
the duties are usually interrelated.
For example, although the Thompsons' landowner duties of
protecting people from latent defects on the land are separate from the
duties that they owe as employers and co-employees under the IIA,
these duties are so intertwined that they cannot be completely
separated. 1" In Evans, the decedents fell down a manhole on the
Thompsons' personal property and died as a result of methane gas
accumulations. This unfortunate accident would not have occurred,
however, had Santana not ordered the decedents to work on the site.
Furthermore, because Santana used the land as part of its daily
business, the Thompsons were more likely to have discovered the
latent defect as a result of their involvement with Santana than through
their personal land ownership. Because the dual persona doctrine
requires that, in order to be held liable as a third party, an employer
or a co-employee possess a second legal persona "completely independent from and unrelated to his status as employer,"' 1 1 the dual
persona doctrine by definition does not apply in situations such as in
Evans. When an employer personally owns the land on which his or
her employees work, the employer's duties under the IIA and the
employer's landowner duties are interconnected; thus, in most
instances, the dual persona doctrine should not apply. If the doctrine
were applied, it would serve only to put individual landowners at risk
of being held liable for the same workplace injuries against which they
have already insured by paying into the workers' compensation fund.

109. See, e.g., Royster v. Montanez, 184 Cal. Rptr. 560, 565 (Ct. App. 1982) ("By
occupying land or other premises as workplace, an employer cannot be said to have undertaken
some extra-employer role or to have assumed some obligation which is separate and distinct from
its capacity as an employer. Occupation of land is a normal and usual incident of being an
employer."), superseded by statute as stated in Siva v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 194 Cal. Rptr.
51 (Ct. App. 1983); Vaughn v. Jernigan, 242 S.E.2d 482, 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
the employer's knowledge of an allegedly defective condition on the land came to him not through
his ownership of the premises, but through his role as an officer of the employer corporation;
thus, the duties were intertwined).
110. 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.81, at 14-290.88.
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This does not mean that the dual persona doctrine could not
theoretically apply in some very specific landowner contexts, however.
The dissent writes that under the dual persona doctrine "an injured
worker may avoid the strict exclusivity provisions of the Industrial
Insurance Act in a narrow group of cases in which an otherwise
immune co-employee has breached a duty owed the injured worker in
a completely separate and unrelated identity."'.
Such a circumstance might arise, for example, when a separate partnership or other
business entity owned by the employer or co-employee, but unrelated
to the business in which the injured employee was injured, owned the
land on which the employee was injured. In that case, the partnership
or business entity would owe a separate landowner duty to an injured
employee, one totally unrelated to the employer or co-employee's
duties under the IIA. Such a situation differs from the scenario in
Evans where the Thompsons' individual duties were more closely
intertwined with their duties as employers and co-employees.
A second reason the dual persona doctrine should not apply in
most landowner cases is that the doctrine circumvents the exclusive
remedy provision of the IIA. Most authorities oppose the use of the
doctrine in the landowner context for this very reason:
It is held with virtual unanimity than an employer cannot be sued
as the owner or occupier of land ....
Apart from the basic argument that mere ownership of land
does not endow a person with a second legal persona or entity, there
is an obvious practical reason requiring this result. An employer,
as part of his business, will almost always own or occupy premises,
and maintain them as an integral part of conducting his business.
If every action and function connected with maintaining the
premises could ground a tort suit, the concept of exclusiveness of
remedy would be reduced to nothingness.'12
The dissent agrees with this authority, stating that without a strict
interpretation of the dual persona doctrine in landowner cases,
employer and co-employee immunity will be weakened to the point of
meaninglessness." 3 Rather than enjoying the statutorily-protected
right to immunity from suit in tort, employers and co-employees

111. Evans v. Thompson, 124 Wash. 2d 435, 451, 879 P.2d 938, 946 (1994) (Dolliver, J.,
dissenting).
112. 2A LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.31, at 14-245, 251.
113. Evans, 124 Wash. 2d at 455, 879 P.2d at 948. Cf. King, supra note 1,at 411-12 ("The
delicately balanced quid pro quo imposing no-fault liability in exchange for immunity from tort
claims and limits on the amount of worker's compensation liability becomes illusory without a
viable exclusive remedy rule.").
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would be held personally liable for accidents directly related to the
operation of the business. Because many small business owners own
land and individually lease that land to their business, such a broad
rule would effectively deter many individuals from starting up small
businesses. Accordingly, the dual persona doctrine should be applied
only in very limited circumstances where its application will not
circumvent the exclusive remedy principle and thwart the growth of
small business.
Finally, the dual persona doctrine should not apply in the
landowner context because by circumventing the exclusive remedy
provision of the IIA, the dual persona doctrine effectively broadens the
third-party statute and creates a new class of potential defendants.
Although courts have held that the IIA should be liberally construed
in favor of injured workers, the third-party provision clearly and
unambiguously provides that workers' compensation is the injured
employee's exclusive remedy; thus, any judicial construction that allows
for suits against employers or co-employees would be a judicial
broadening of the third-party statute and, as such, would be legislation."1 4
B.

The Evans Decision Effectively Applies the Defunct
Dual Capacity Doctrine

In addition to overextending the dual persona doctrine, the Evans
court, in effect, adopted the previously-rejected dual capacity formulation. The majority opinion allows the possibility that the Thompsons
will be held liable merely because they owed duties to the decedents in
two capacities-as corporate directors and as individual landowners.
Because the Thompsons' roles as corporate officers and directors were
closely related to their roles as landowners, the court based potential
liability upon the mere fact that the Thompsons acted in two capacities
toward the decedent workers. This basis for liability harkens back to
the previously rejected dual capacity concept.

114. See Lowry v. Department of Labor and Indust., 21 Wash. 2d 538, 542, 151 P.2d 822,
824 (1944) (holding that where the language of the IIA is ambiguous and exhibits a clear and
reasonable meaning, there is no room for construction), affd en banc, 23 Wash. 2d 936, 159 P.2d
622 (1945); cf. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 242, 588
P.2d 1308, 1316 (1978) (stating that with certain specified exceptions, the IIA abolishes judicial
jurisdiction over all civil actions for workplace injuries between employees and employers: "In
effect, the [IIA] 'immunizes,' from judicial jurisdiction, all tort actions which are premised upon
the 'fault' of the employer vis-a-vis the employee. The determination to abolish judicial
jurisdiction over such 'immunized' conduct was a legislative policy decision. The wisdom of that
decision is not a proper subject of our review.").
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The Thompsons Should Have Been Considered Co-Employees
As a Matter of Law

Finally, the majority should have found, as a matter of law, that
the Thompsons were co-employees of the decedents for purposes of
applying the exclusive remedy principle. The Washington Legislature
clearly provided that co-employees will be immune from suit in tort
under the third-party statute."' Furthermore, the legislature did not
include any limitations on the "same employ" language in that
statute." 6 Had the legislature intended to limit co-employee immunity to those individuals who engage in work at the site of the injury,
rather than officers and directors of the corporation, it could have done
SO17 Because the legislature did not, the court should not limit the
definition of "co-employees" by excluding corporate officers and
directors. Therefore, in remanding the case for a factual finding of
whether the Thompsons were co-employees of the decedent, the court
weakened the exclusive remedy provision without a statutory directive
to do so.
V.

CONCLUSION

Washington State has many closely-held corporations such as
Santana." 8 The implication of the majority's decision in Evans is
that if the Thompsons had not incorporated Santana, they would be
immune from suit under the IIA; but because they did incorporate,
they became a separate legal entity and thus lost their immunity." 9
Accordingly, the dual persona doctrine should be used only in
contexts where common or statutory law clearly defines separate
obligations that arise out of distinct legal personas, not in contexts
involving interrelated legal personas or capacities. Furthermore, the
dual persona doctrine should be used only in those exceptional
circumstances where the employer acts in a second persona so
unrelated to his or her status as an employer that he or she owes
obligations to the worker that are completely independent of the
employer-employee relationship. Application of the doctrine in those
limited circumstances will not frustrate or undermine the general
115. Peterickv. State, 22 Wash. App. 163, 190, 589 P.2d 250, 267 (1977), overruled on other
grounds by Stenberg v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 104 Wash. 2d 710, 709 P.2d 793 (1985).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Evans v. Thompson, 124 Wash. 2d 435, 455, 879 P.2d 938, 948 (1994).
119. See id. Such a holding presents a great disincentive to small, family-owned businesses
to incorporate. As a result, these businesses lose out on the benefits of incorporation.
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policies of the exclusive remedy principle or judicially broaden
employer and co-employee liability. Finally, in situations such as in
Evans, corporate officers and directors should be considered coemployees as a matter of law for the purposes of applying the exclusive
remedy principle. Although in some circumstances the dual persona
doctrine may be appropriately and correctly applied, Evans v.
Thompson is not such a case.

